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ABSTRACT 
One significant aspect of military interventions is that violence in binary 
geographies, which have an implied colonial discourse (such as Serbia), 
often involve the dialectics of construction and erasure, meaning that 
absence and presence of destruction and violence run side by side.1 This 
paper investigates the ways that technology and media were 
instrumentalised in miniaturising evidence and reducing the visibility of 
destruction during NATO’s Operation Allied Force in Serbia and Kosovo. 
While the dominant NATO rhetoric behind the intervention was 
“humanitarian” with the Operation being deployed in the name of 
Western values and civilisation, this text puts forward an alternative 
argument. The 1999 intervention was a war machine where the military-
industrial-media-entertainment network restricted the public gaze and the 
control of information as well as made it nearly impossible to distinguish 
information from disinformation, and fact from fiction. Its value was 
predicated on expressing and showing less of the violence in order to set 
up a clear representation of a perpetrator and a victim. Thus, the 
reconceptualisation of borders in relation to 1999 was contingent on the 
deployment of the infrastructure of satellites and unmanned drones in an 
attempt to, firstly, miniaturise the weapon and, secondly, de-familiarise 
the military frame with spectacular speed. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
NATO’s foremost reasoning for the implementation of Operation Allied Force in 
1999 – a high-intensity air campaign that lasted for 78 days (24 March  – 10 June) – 
was the termination of violence and ethnic cleansing by the Slobodan Milosevic 
regime in Kosovo and Metohija.2 On 31 March 1999, former US President Bill 
Clinton stated that the objective of the Operation was to “raise the price of aggression 
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to an unacceptably high level so that we can get back to talking peace and security, to 
substantially undermine the capacity of the Serbian government to wage war.”3 The 
notion of security was underpinned by a discourse of morality. The former UK 
President Tony Blair openly spoke about the Operation being a means to protect 
European values whereby NATO’s targeting was a “battle for the values of 
civilisation itself and democracy everywhere.”4 Furthermore, according to the 
Secretary General of NATO, Javier Solana, the military operation was described as a 
necessary humanitarian intervention with Kosovo being “a defining moment not only 
for Nato [sic. NATO], but for the kind of Europe we wish to live in at the beginning 
of the 21st century.”5  
 
While this paper acknowledges that violence took place prior and during the 
intervention in 1999, the focus of the text is on the deployment of violence that 
occurred during the Kosovo War from a more coercive and less visible frame. It 
proposes an understanding of borders in relation to media and technology, whereby 
representations of the same event (NATO’s Operation Allied Force) from different 
sides was contingent on the construction and erasure of particular modes of violence. 
Such an approach is marginal when compared with the usual foci of architectural 
analyses since physical artefacts are mediated by media representations and 
manipulations. They cannot be apprehended or examined directly. Consequently, as 
evident in this paper, to understand the coercive geographies of violence one needs to 
traverse literature from communications and media studies, as well as historical texts 
on the conflict in the former-Yugoslav context and mainstream news media. Thus, 
this paper begins with a discussion of the military-industrial-media-entertainment 
network as presented by scholars of the conflict in this Balkan zone, followed by an 
examination of how media and technology can be used to construct or erase violence, 
its representations of public and private space and resultant notions of speed and time.  
 
According to Stephen Graham, violence in its making and purging benefits the 
military.6 The process is reliant on framing violence by miniaturisation of borders 
whereby infrastructure of media and technology becomes a flexible agent to advance 
the effort of the global emergency as part of the fight against alleged terror in 
supposed rogue territories where security must be pursued through military means.7 
The stated aim of this paper is to examine Western and Serbian rhetoric on the 
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Kosovo conflict during the NATO intervention in order to draw connections and 
implications of the military-industrial-media-entertainment network. The network, as 
theorised by Paul Virilio and James Der Derian, is a type of a war machine that not 
only assists in manipulating the line between fact and fiction so that the complexity of 
war and violence is reduced, but through the conflation of media and technology can 
help disguise possible acts of crime.8 It is operationalised, as already suggested, in the 
name of “security and peace”, “'civil values” and “humanitarianism”.  
 
In contrast to the wars of the ancients, which were sporadic and where possession of 
forts and citadels was contested in the fairly transparent language of war-fighting 
techniques through face-to-face confrontations, or with modern wars, which were 
more systematic and centralised, current methods of warfare are more dispersed and 
flexible. They are fought in living rooms rather than in trenches.9 In other words, 
media in living rooms play a significant role in perpetuating the language to construct 
the other, and, in turn, construct the necessity for wars on terror. The other in relation 
to Kosovo, according to Philip Hammond, was history invoked to suggest that the 
Balkans, and Serbia in particular, was outside the scope of modernity and 
civilisation.10 For Paul Virilio, media and technology have been used to accelerate 
and extend the limits of conventional war strategies, where the modern world of 
militarisation is one in motion.11 For James Der Derian, it is a virtual war machine 
where war fought from a distance eliminates guilt and responsibility.12  
 
Unlike the 1991 Gulf War where the military deployed information technology and 
media as part of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), 1999 Operation Allied 
Force has been extended in that it has been called “a humanitarian intervention, 
coercive diplomacy, the first information war, and the first war won by airpower 
alone”13 with no casualties on NATO’s side. The intervention was aimed at gaining 
legitimised access and control of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’s (FRY) air 
space. It was an attempt at realising the aerial panopticon by morphing media, 
entertainment, technology and the military in order to discipline. For Virilio, speed is 
a key aspect in war and he compares the morphing – which Der Derian terms the 
military-industrial-media-entertainment network – with Alzhemeir’s disease as it 
affects memory, disorients and limits perception.14 The ideas of Graham, Virilio and 
Der Derian find application in the concrete situation of the NATO bombing where 
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military strategies were seamlessly transferred into urban architecture. Despite the 
intervention being framed through a “humanitarian”  lens the means of pursuing these 
motives was through the built environment; following Andrew Hersher’s thinking, 
war was conducted through architecture.15 The significance of architecture is 
precisely because NATO’s operation particularly targeted the built environment in its 
pursuit of the objectives of the Operation Allied Force. Architecture and urban 
contexts were enfolded into the military-industrial-media-entertainment network. The 
rhetoric and the war on terror could in this way be seen as a coercive attempt at full 
spectrum dominance,16 made possible by military strategies and surveillance deployed 
through urban infrastructure.  
 
[Fig 1 about here: Panopticon. Photographs: Nikolina Bobic.] 
 
 
MEDIA AND TECHNOLOGY: CONSTRUCTING AND ERASING VIOLENCE 
If NATO’s intervention was geared towards defying moral values and signposting 
what a civilised culture may be through the rhetoric of humanitarianism, peace and 
security, there has been a peculiar way of showcasing these qualities. War and bombs 
now also extend to information manipulation, which according to Virilio is an integral 
part of the military-industrial-media-entertainment network.17 The contemporary 
system of values seems to be geared towards morphing entertainment media with war 
and technology as a type of spectacular entertainment. Even more spectacularly, 
NATO’s targeting of civilian dwellings is concealed by a “humanitarian” pretext 
where destruction is inflicted for “humanity”.18 While destruction of buildings can be 
justified as legitimate military targets, the fact that all destruction – military and 
civilian, inert and alive – was described as “collateral damage” is, according to 
Herscher, “destruction without humanity”. 19  
 
Hersher’s destruction without humanity is evident in NATO’s “humanitarian” 
intervention  beginning with the pretext of saving Albanian lives and ending up 
adding to the overall death tally. While the examples are (unfortunately) extensive, 
these particular cases of civilian deaths (Albanian and Serb) were the result of NATO 
strikes on transport routes, for example, on 14 April, NATO bombed a convoy of 
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Albanian refugees on a Prizren-Djakovica road killing 75 civilians, and wounding 
over 60.20 While some Western media criticised supposed accidents such as this one, 
the general rhetoric was not that the intervention enhanced the refugee crisis but 
rather that of support as the intervention was acted upon moral reasons.21 Through 
“humanitarian” induced rhetoric orchestrated with carefully constructed images, the 
viewers of news stories are habitually moulded to perceive the violence taking place 
through the gaze of a military-industrial-media-entertainment network. The 
disciplining is never overt. On one hand, the viewers are disciplined by passively 
consuming the images presented on a screen. On the other hand, disciplining is a 
result of the instilled fear that, if the war is not waged, security in the supposedly 
civilised world will likely be breached. This rhetoric is indicated in Virilio’s writings 
where “the conquest of panoptical uniquity would lead to the conquest of passivity, 
with populations not so much succumbing to military defeat, as in the past, but 
succumbing to mental confusion.”22 Thus, the very notion of borders projected in this 
discourse is fluid, and adaptable; deployed to suit the agenda of the war machine. 
There is a dual motive of collapsing memory and disciplining viewers.  
 
The military-industrial-media-entertainment network, according to Der Derian, 
hollows out the possibility of alternatives; the virtual screen is used “for the display of 
dazzling virtual effects, from digital war games to national party conventions to 
video-camera bombing.”23 The network facilitates the treatment of memory and 
history as a space in limbo, where all points of reference become unreliable, whilst 
managing a hegemonic and panoptic understanding of memory and history. In 
describing the panopticon, Michel Foucault uses the example of a state prison where 
guards watch the prisoners from a concealed central guard post, their omnipresence 
instigating self-discipline in prisoners. This relationship, Foucault argues, mirrors 
larger social disciplining practices experimented with in the modern institutions of the 
nation state. A new interpretation of the panopticon as a mechanism for surveillance 
is captured in Virilio’s writings on the Kosovo War, where he states it is no longer  
 
a question so much of observing what is happening on those countries’ 
frontiers, as what is happening above them, towards the firmament, and this 
would be no small matter, since this ‘lofty, extraterrestrial vantage point’ 
would cancel out any geopolitical perspective, the vertical dimension 
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winning out by a very long way – or, more exactly, from a very great height 
– over the horizontal.24 
 
The contemporary panopticon disciplines on the ground, from a vantage point in the 
sky. NATO’s targeting of cities and urban infrastructure in the FRY executes a form 
of violence facilitated by ocular hegemony morphed with marketing and the media. It 
is conveyed through the militarisation of information presented on media/television 
screens. The dominant rhetoric and the premise for NATO’s intervention was that 
Serbia refused to sign the Rambouillet Agreement,25 with little critical information 
directed to the complexity of violence and the background of conflict in Kosovo. 26 
These ideas are demonstrated in CNN’s well-rehearsed style of reporting, evident 
since the Gulf War, where a clear us vs them moral binary is constructed.27 Needless 
to say that the media network did not address questions to do with NATO’s 
intervention, undermining the role of the UN and thus altering the international 
procedures to instate this military intervention.28 Where attempts were made to 
unpack the conflict, according to Hammond, they were explained in terms of “ancient 
ethnic hatreds”29 or “quasi-colonial Serbian aggression, despite the fact that […] the 
KLA was known to be the main instigator of violence in the period immediately 
before Nato [sic. NATO] intervened.”30  
 
In respect to the Yugoslav media and the Milosevic regime, disciplining occurred in a 
very specific way; through law. Up until 1998, apart from the pro-Milosevic Radio 
Television Serbia (RTS), existence of privately owned media such as B92 radio 
station and newspapers such as Dnevni telegraf meant that pro-Western views 
including an open critique of the situation in Kosovo were heard.31 However, in 
October 1998 – 5 months prior to NATO’s intervention – media legislation was 
passed at the federal level where excessive fines were to be issued to any media that 
was openly against Milosevic.32 The law was implemented several times towards 
Dnevni telegraf, which resulted in other newspapers toning down their anti-Milosevic 
stance or suspending their publication altogether. 33 The rhetoric of privately owned 
media was in complete contrast to the RTS which failed to show that Serbian military 
operations did involve attacks on Albanian civilians, sometimes targeting whole 
villages regardless whether civilians were real or imagined supporters of the Kosovo 
Liberation Army (KLA).34  
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The RTS building was targeted by NATO on the nights between 22-23 April 1999, an 
action justified on the basis that RTS was identifying with Milosevic’s propaganda-
driven government. However, and according to Virilio, the destruction of the RTS 
building illustrates the importance of gaining control of information and can be 
interpreted as an attempt to establish a single market of data and images.35 This 
reduces the possibility of verifying information, news reports and stories, and helps 
establish the hegemony of a single market of surveillance. The unlikelihood of 
eliminating all pro-Milosevic media networks was known and acknowledged. 
According to NATO’s supreme commander General Wesley Clark, NATO “knew 
when we struck that there would be alternate means of getting the Serb Television. 
There’s no single switch to turn off everything but we thought that it was a good 
move to strike it and the political leadership agreed with us.”36 The attack on a 
building, with its workforce of 120 technical and production staff, disrupted Serbian 
TV broadcasts for three hours at the cost of sixteen lives and eighteen wounded. 
Reportedly, NATO also announced that “it would shut down Yugoslavia’s Internet 
links, the first threat of the kind, although to have actually done so would have been 
practically impossible.”37 The dominant agenda in the military-industrial-media-
entertainment network described here was the rhetoric of simplistic reduction by 
blurring the ability to verify information, and halting alternative sources of media.  
 
[Fig 2 about here: NATO targeted and still unreconstructed RTS building.  
Photographs: Nikolina Bobic.] 
 
 
PUBLIC/PRIVATE SPACE: REPRESENTATION THROUGH BLURRING  
Ways of representing and understanding violence is contingent on blurring the ability 
to verify the very extent of violence. This blurring, according to Franke Wilmer, can 
be found in “the lines distinguishing the territory of one nation from another, police 
officer from soldier, and soldier from civilian, the stereotyping that underlies hate 
speech and war mongering and makes prejudices into an ideology.”38 This blurring of 
boundaries was exemplified in the manner in which Belgrade’s population became a 
NATO target despite their divided loyalties. A considerable portion of that population 
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did not support the Milosevic government, and made their position evident in several 
mass gatherings throughout the 1990s. In 1996-97, during the three-month-long mass 
protests which averaged 100,000 people per day, humour was used to make political 
comments on Milosevic’s rigging of votes and as a general sign of disapproval of the 
Milosevic regime.39 People also voiced disagreement against the regime by banging 
on pots and pans during the Milosevic-induced propaganda evening news.40 
Additionally, on 13 December 1996, there was a gathering of 250,000 people to pay 
respect to Ferizu Balakcariju, an Albanian from Kosovo, who was another victim of 
Yugoslav police brutality.41 These mass gatherings were also prevalent in the early 
1990s, where Belgrade’s public space was used as an urban demonstration space 
against the Yugoslav disintegration and the Milosevic regime.42 The protests were 
brutally suppressed, even in some cases through the deployment of the Yugoslav 
People’s Army (JNA) tanks. The population was dehumanised both by the Milosevic 
regime in the 1990s and the Western economic and travel sanctions imposed on 
Belgrade and FRY beginning in 1993. These conditions remained operative into the 
2000s. 
 
In 1999, Belgrade’s populace became legitimate NATO targets because of the 
assumption that alternative positions and perspectives were not possible in one 
political system and society. The populace responded, once again, through mass 
gatherings in what became known as the Songs Sustained Us (Pesma nas je odrzala). 
During NATO’s Operation Allied Force, at any given time approximately 15,000 
people utilised Republic Square for rock, hip-hop, R’n’B and turbo-folk43 music 
concerts.44 Christine Lavrence observes that the Songs Sustained Us events had “an 
almost carnavalesque character, in the Bakhtinian sense of subversion through 
reversal and parody.”45 At night, the Songs Sustained Us gatherings spilled onto 
Belgrade’s bridges, hosting gatherings of the greatest intensity where concerts 
continued and human bodies became shields for the bridge. NATO strikes coincided 
with the Milosevic regime’s intensification of its own disciplining of the citizenry of 
Belgrade and Serbia. This practice is illustrated in articles in newspapers such as the 
Serbian state-run Politika, which provided instruction on how to recognise and 
respond to different emergency sounds, as well as patriotic texts on the vitality and 
nutritional value of national dishes, affirming that food was plentiful. In May 1999, 
spurred by sporadic disruption of electricity and water supplies, Politika’s articles 
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proffered serious advice on how to preserve foods and conserve water. The loyalties 
of citizens fluctuated during the conflict period, evidencing a complete reversal 
towards the war’s end. Some Milosevic owned media stations interpreted the Songs 
Sustained Us gatherings as signs of support for the regime (despite the history of 
1990s gatherings when the population in Belgrade was significantly against the 
Milosevic government and violence directed towards the Albanians in Kosovo). 
During the 1999 incursion, however, the population of Belgrade was possibly more 
supportive of Milosevic than it was at any point during the 1990s. This support 
predominantly occurred because the population agreed with Milosevic’s refusal to 
sign the Rambouillet Agreement, and the associated non-negotiability of legal, 
territorial and free-market conditions stipulated in the Agreement. At that point in 
time, Milosevic was seen as a lesser evil compared to NATO. Whereas the 
contemptuous RTS acquired heroic status due to its refusal to side with the West, the 
once pro-Western Dnevni telegraf was shut on the very first day of the intervention 
while B92 kept running only to be overthrown midway into the Operation.46 
However, the fact that Slobodan Milosevic was removed from his position in the 
autumn of 2000 as a result of mass protest would attest to Western belief of the 
Serbian populace being in support of the regime.47   
 
Since the Songs Sustained Us events were played out on Western television in an 
edited form might resonate with Foucault’s idea of justice as shifting from the public 
to the private sphere.48 By utilising the television screen, NATO strikes on Belgrade 
were presented as a “humanitarian” intervention, whilst obscuring the destruction 
caused by the bombings on the ground. This rhetorical morality was facilitated by the 
possibility of editing out any form of revolt or resistance that takes place in that 
outside public space. The interpretation of these events in the Western media was 
therefore not that of a public will to resist control, but public gatherings as evidence 
of Milosevic’s nationalism. As already mentioned, Milosevic’s nationalist-driven 
media stations applied a similar technique. NATO strikes and the Songs Sustained Us 
events were used coercively as signs of support in an attempt to extend the legitimacy 
of Milosevic’s rule as well as hide the violence perpetrated by the FRY 
military/police. During the 1999 operation, and according to one of many opponents 
of the Milosevic regime, a Belgrade student was noted as saying that it is “impossible 
to be correctly informed, either by listening to the Serb media, picking up the Western 
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media or surfing the Internet. Wherever you turn, there’s just propaganda.”49 The 
public and private gaze was (almost) eliminated, as the control of information made it 
(almost) impossible to distinguish information from disinformation. This coercive 
control of the media was used to blur the line between fact and fiction, and in turn 
help manage a particular understanding of events, memory and history. NATO’s 
operation used the media and information operations to generate support for its 
military campaign. The justification for the intervention was framed by invoking 
moral values, making comparisons to the Holocaust and extending the rhetoric of the 
war in Bosnia and Herzegovina.50 In this media spectacle there is a different 
conception of borders; serving a multifaceted war machine where the territory of a 
country is firstly fragmented, movement paralysed and information blurred, so its 
violence can be entrenched in space and time to affect the urban and architectural 
spaces of everyday life.  
 
The war machine supported by technology and the spectacle of the media screen 
minimises the possibility of verifying the situation that is taking place on the ground. 
Complex on-ground scenarios are constructed and presented in reductive images and 
language, and limited to the time and grid of the frame. The immediate and 
unquestioned acceptance of a unidimensional story presented on a screen (which is 
ironically presented as a transparent window into the world of events), is the last 
wall.51 It is reminiscent of the photography of Andreas Gursky, which is suggestive of 
a frictionless landscape of loosely connected parts bolstered by tenuous virtual 
transparency.52 In other words, Gursky’s work exemplifies the uncomfortable 
construct of clarity and formality set against the ambiguity these scenes might 
resonate with. This flattening of complexity, and side-by-side construction and 
elimination of violence, intensifies the colonial discourse of violence in binary 
geographies such as Serbia. NATO’s targeting of Belgrade, underpinned by the 
rhetoric of historic barbarism, becomes justifiable and swiftly accepted as evidence 
and confirmation that certain nations are allegedly naturally prone to acts of violence.  
 
Violence encountered in sport is used as one such example. Virilio writes that 
“football simulates primordial territorial clan warfare, and the supporters of Red Star 
Belgrade are quickly recast [by the West] as the shock troops of Serbia sweeping 
through Bosnia.”53 The tendency to regard certain spaces and histories, such as that of 
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the Balkans and Serbia, as prone to violence treats identity as fixed and aids in 
discursively positioning such supposed zones of violence as areas that can only be 
dealt with by using “humanitarian” force. The “humanitarian” crisis was validated by 
drawing reference to the recognised view on the war in Bosnia, and the refugee crisis 
facilitated by the Kosovo war.54 Here, the perception and the appearance of a 
particular zone is through a limited window/vision. Considering that “speed, time and 
visibility are framed in the limit of the minimal slit perception”55 further implies that 
the perception of citizens of NATO countries watching NATO’s execution of 
violence share this shallow interpretation since in both instances – sport and war – the 
citizens were part of a media spectacle. More so, the fact that the NATO strikes on 
Belgrade were presented to the world via the television screen further facilitated the 
demonisation of one person, Slobodan Milosevic, who was compared to Hitler.56 For 
NATO, there was an overlapping of like and likely, where in this instance the whole 
of Belgrade’s population became like the war criminal Milosevic and therefore 
instantaneously became a likely ally of the regime. This reductive assumption allowed 
individuals to become legitimate targets. Both the Serbian and Western media 
invoked attributes of Fascism to discipline the populace. In the West, this was done 
through the rhetoric of Milosevic as the “new Hitler.” 57 The RTS also deployed the 
WWII rhetoric; by replaying WWII patriotic films, such as The Battle of Neretva or 
Sutjeska, when the Yugoslav anti-Nazi resistance (the Partisans) successfully fought 
against the Germans (in this instance (in)directly compared with NATO).58 Other 
visible instances of violence through forms of mimicry were also noted during the 
Songs Sustained Us gatherings where there were instances of an American flag being 
redesigned so that the stars were turned into Nazi swastikas. Not only were acts of 
violence easily manipulated, but history became a key tool in doing so. 
 
[Fig 3 about here: Virtual War as distance in sight/site. Photographs: Nikolina Bobic.] 
 
 
PANOPTICON: SPEED-IN-VARIATION 
The narrative of “absence” and “presence” of violence is implemented through wires, 
satellites and unmanned drones.59 This proposition is complemented in Virilio’s 
Strategy of Deception, where he suggests that the war in Kosovo was a war of the 
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airwaves as it took place in the electromagnetic ether, utilising the global positioning 
system (GPS) and global information dominance (GID).60 NATO’s 1999 targeting 
included monitoring and framing of images presented to the world via the 
infrastructure of electric wires and satellites, where a missile that is equipped with a 
camera is used to both destroy, survey and record the targeted infrastructure on the 
ground. Technology, as demonstrated in the use of a missile to frame and destroy a 
target and then record it, is also an attempt to firstly miniaturise the weapon as well as 
de-familiarise the military frame, which is presented through a camera lens. The lens 
eliminates the human (subjective) gaze and replaces it with a technological (objective) 
gaze. Thus the cruise missiles become both weapons and machines of spectacle and 
legal evidence, where any gaps in erasing and constructing evidence can be 
seamlessly altered. The current disciplining practice is thus a form of permanent 
coercion, where the military is the new state prison and police. The speed at which 
these processes occur is significant. 
 
The focused framing of violence is demonstrated in NATO’s allegedly accidental 
targeting of a civilian occupied train crossing the Grdelica bridge, located 250 
kilometres south-east of Belgrade, a transport route that according to NATO “was a 
vital supply line for Serbian troops in Kosovo.”61 This event occurred on 12 April, 
1999. NATO’s spokesman Jamie Shea conferred that “a very extensive analysis [… 
was done …] which shows the pilot was totally unable to realize, to know before 
releasing his weapon that a train would appear on the bridge.”62 The narrative of 
General Wesley Clark is even more detailed in that the pilot was focused on the 
bridge, 
 
when all of a sudden, at the very last instant, with less than a second to go, he 
caught a flash of movement that came into a screen and it was the train 
coming in. Unfortunately, he couldn’t dump the bomb at that point. It was 
locked, it was going into the target and it was an unfortunate incident which 
he and the crew and all of us very much regret.63 
 
The narrative was that the train was travelling too fast for the trajectory of the missiles 
to have been changed in time to avoid killing fourteen civilian passengers and 
wounding sixty more.64 The video was replayed on Western television screens 
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incessantly in order to demonstrate that the speed of missiles means that “accidents” 
such as these are often unavoidable.65 The targeting was only seen as violent when a 
train emerged and became visible on the bridge. If this information remained 
undisclosed and unseen, its violence would have passed unnoticed.  
 
In January 2000, the unavoidability of the incident was called into question. The 
footage shown at the initial NATO press conference was revealed to have been altered 
so as to triple the actual speed recorded by a camera installed in the warhead of one of 
the missiles targeting the bridge.66 The variation of speed was attributed to technology 
as Shea was noted as saying that the speeded-up video was caused by a “technical 
phenomenon” rather than human manipulation.67 Using technology to deny 
responsibility for atrocities was also seen after WWII. According to Virilio, Albert 
Speer used the efficiency of technology in his defence during the Nuremburg Trial in 
order “to prove that he was only an instrument, certainly guilty, but that technological 
advances, in particular in the field of communications, had issued in the 
catastrophe.”68 The argument is not that NATO’s killing of fourteen civilians is 
comparable to the large-scale genocide of Jews during WWII. Instead, the comparison 
is meant to suggest that technology is now both an instrument that can erase evidence 
of (possibly deliberate) crime through a process of speed-in-variation, as well as for a 
sole instrument to be called on as the perpetrator of crime. Similarly, through 
manipulation of what is visible on a screen, achieved through processes of editing, 
cutting and commentary, the violent effects of NATO’s bombing of Belgrade was 
suppressed. When viewed in this way, NATO’s strikes do not appear as acts of 
violence. The manipulation is also suggested in the alteration of figures. Despite 
NATO’s tally of destruction, inclusive of and not limited to bridges, power plants and 
the countryside, NATO’s reports only note destruction of military armaments.69 Thus, 
the elimination of the horizon of perception and vision is also the elimination of 
information despite claims of an open information network in many post-industrial 
societies. NATO’s strategy in the 1999 Operation Allied Force thus exemplifies 
Virilio’s writings on the military-information-media-entertainment complex. Through 
the digital screen and edited constructions of news stories presented on screen, 
situations taking place in the rest of the world are taken for granted.70 The presented 
image on a screen becomes the world in a glimpse. The acceleration and manipulation 
of speed has not only affected the perspective, but has eliminated the foreground and 
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background by eradicating volume and depth; the outcome being “the progressive 
desertification of various surfaces (territories, bodies, objects).”71 The frame of the 
military-industrial-media-entertainment network acts as a limit and form of 
confinement.72 The resultant reconceptualisation of borders is, thus, directed towards 
elimination of duration in the attempt for absolute conquest of speed,73 and the 
“gradual dematerialization of the earth’s horizon” described by Virilio.74 It is the 
surge towards eliminating the horizon line. 
 
[Fig 4 about here: Constructions: evidence in motion. Artwork (mixed media): 
Nikolina Bobic.] 
 
Delimitation is contingent on mental confusion, a tactic deployed in the NATO 
Operation. NATO’s evidence of the Operation – the images of destruction – often 
needed to be interpreted due to their illegibility. During the 14 May 1999 briefing, 
NATO’s spokesman Jamie Shea had to interpret evidence of how the Serb forces 
destroyed buildings in Kosovo and Metohija.75 According to Andrew Herscher,  
 
[t]he subjects of these images, pictured in a bitmapped haze of pixels, had to 
be enmeshed in a complex apparatus of written, graphic, and verbal signs in 
order to become legible. The image of a building in flames, or damaged or 
even destroyed, was incomprehensible without an identifying text signifying 
flames, damage, or destruction. The rhetorical distance of irony in Shea’s 
presentation thus mapped onto the spectatorial distance of his satellite 
imagery. Was it possible to get up close and personal to a satellite image in 
1999? Was it possible to lead spectators from a network of pixels to a vale of 
tears?76 
 
Shea’s commentary may well be an example of what Eyal Weizman terms “only a 
criminal being able to interpret a crime.”77 The images are endowed with meanings 
and made to speak a particular rhetoric. The nature of these illegible images is 
peculiar considering that throughout the operation, NATO used videos mounted onto 
missiles to film the destruction of a particular target from the moment the weapon was 
discharged to the moment the missile struck the target.78 The military, media and the 
law (as seen in Shea’s interpretation of pixels as evidence of destruction by Serb 
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forces) form a trinity where the value of language and images is to show less through 
de-familiarisation of a military frame.  
 
The manifestation of speed on the Serbian side was exemplified differently. When the 
Serbian Armed Forced shot down NATO’s Lockheed F-117A Nighthawk stealth 
aircraft on 27 March 1999 – only three days into NATO’s campaign – the outcome 
was significant in several ways. It is not necessarily only for the reasons that the 
aircraft was detected, shot down and that it touched the ground at low speed, but more 
so for the symbolism that it invoked. The dominant Serbian rhetoric was that 
“although a small and impoverished country like Yugoslavia could not challenge US 
power, it could de facto question America’s absolute power.”79 This event was also 
marked during the Songs Sustained Us gatherings. The prominent message on 
banners in the early days of the gatherings was Sorry, we didn’t know it was invisible. 
The catch-phrase was also printed on badges, stickers and T-shirts. With time, the 
messages on banners diversified, ranging from humour to nationalism: Sorry we are 
singing, With bombs for a better tomorrow? Clinton, you are sick to America – 
pumpkin without a root, NATO – New America Terrorist Organisation, Kosovo is 
Serbia, and In alliance with the people and motherland until we reach victory. There 
is a risk involved in interpreting the complexity of the situation at face value, and also 
summing it up inadequately through these single catch-phrase slogans; indicative of 
the Serbian populace subjection to the military-industrial-media-entertainment 
complex. The relation of speed to discipline is that the line that differentiates war 
from peace is ever less transparent. More so, there is a general cautionary aspect to 
the speed at which media narrates, interprets and sides with particular events. Whilst 
the task of a journalist is to immediately analyse and report, the very fact that these 
articles are a first attempt at writing this history indicates the power these words may 
have within the political context in which they are used.80 The implication is that a 
different value system needs to be given to language and images in order to show 
more, rather than less of the currently de-familiarised military frame. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
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The Operation Allied Forced is an example of wars fought from labs and media hubs 
where violence is becoming more opaque.81 The visibility of fighting has been 
miniaturised, no longer occurring on the ground but fought remotely from the air and 
through the infrastructure of satellites and wires. With the alleged need to protect 
against terror, the necessity for external and internal, and general and particular 
security also grows in partnership with rising insecurity and fear. People are willing to 
submit to the power of the military because they fear having their urban surroundings, 
their buildings and homes targeted. The submission exists in the militarisation of 
information presented on media screens, where violence becomes normalised and 
approval attained in a highly orchestrated and seamless way. Citizens become passive 
recipients of this violence that penetrates their living rooms through television screens 
mediating and interpreting the terms of destruction. The analogy of the panopticon 
interpreted for this scenario implies that power exists and stands ready to be used, but 
it is not there to be seen in a tangible physical way like a gun or a warship. 
Suggestively, the narrative of “absence” and “presence” of violence was also 
deployed in NATO’s 1999 campaign in the form of wires, satellites and unmanned 
drones.82 Thus, borders reconceptualised in this manner manifest as a synthesised 
military-industrial-media-entertainment network – a war machine – directed towards 
not only manufacturing, but blurring the realms of myth/history, rhetoric and 
spectacle. This machine is contingent on speed being mobilised to veil the extreme 
and continuous, yet not overt, presence of violence and war. Peculiarly, these qualities 
are the folly of Western civil values. 
 
[Fig 5 about here: Borders as War Machine. Artwork (mixed media): Nikolina 
Bobic.] 
 
 
FIGURES: 
Figure 1: Panopticon. Photographs: Nikolina Bobic. 
Figure 2: NATO targeted and still unreconstructed RTS building. Photographs: 
Nikolina Bobic. 
Figure 3: Virtual War as distance in sight/site. Photographs: Nikolina Bobic. 
Figure 4: Constructions: evidence in motion. Artwork (mixed media): Nikolina Bobic. 
Figure 5: Borders as War Machine. Artwork (mixed media): Nikolina Bobic. 
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